"cogito, ergo sum" – what is it?

Taken as a whole, one can say that it achieves knowledge in a particular manner – it's epistemic.
On the surface, things seem to flow naturally as far as propositions go.

Upon further examination we have:
a) a cognitive function (cogito)
b) 'abstracted' from an ontology (sum)
c) and finally fused back into relation with it as its determinant (ergo)

Obviously, DesCartes was happy to arrive at what to him was a bastion of certitude, but the nuclear dynamic of his proposition begs attention.

That the thought process should be set apart from, and in a real sense 'over' <being> itself is reason for pause . . .

The mutation is startling.

And here I would note; as tremendous a power as the 'ratio' may be, it is a linear process, and hence, although it is capable of pointing beyond itself, it can only comprehend systems. It is inherently systematic.

Perhaps an analogy to a pot of coffee is apropos. I could boil it down until only the grounds and tar were left at the bottom to discover "Hey, this is powerful stuff!" I might use it to take rust off my car, but I wouldn't want to drink it.

So, rather than leave uncharitably unexplained the accusation of "Cartesian", it is this deeper sense from which I'm making the judgment.

I will ask my teachers about Carnelite Personalism, let's see what they have to say. And thank you.

Anthropology – a noble pursuit! And in this day and age so sorely needed.

If I may recommend to you a subject of interest which has become near and dear to me, do look up "Carmelite Personalism". You will find no shortage of material for your studies, I assure you.

You have my well wishes : )

The link between dualism and Christianity is quite obvious these days. Since the soul is purely subjective by nature, many Christians often use dualism to somehow prove the existence of the supernatural. That post attacked creationism by defeating the concept of having a soul, and thus dualism by proxy. Compared to the vast differences between scientific realism and creationism, the differences between the various dualistic philosophies in this context are minor enough to generalize in my opinion.

And you're right; the form or "conceptual landscape" at issue is decidedly subtle in its dimensions.

So, while we are all invoking the name of DesCartes, the significance as I see it proceeds from his simple formulation "cogito, ergo sum". This served as the harbinger and seed-bed for the propagation of a mentality and predisposition ultimately oriented to an 'objective' epistemology that was Absolute in nature (where it found perhaps its most radical and exhaustive proponent in Kant, I might add). This predisposition in turn necessarily disrupted the delicate nature of the relationship between the objective and subjective.

And while your treatment of the subject-object relationship is appreciable, the Cartesian influence is palpable.

Also, I did read through your Turing/Moore/dualism post and just a couple of points to mention:
1) there are a great many dualisms, with the Cartesian form being but one, so you may want to revisit some of the assertions you put forward where it might be getting unduly generalized
2) if my witness is worth anything, I should hope you would be disavowed of the belief that Cartesian dualism has any place within Catholic/Christian dogma or doctrine

If you prefer me to take up the points in your post directly, I can do so.

Is it evident? That in itself is both self defeating and confirming, how funny. Anyhow, I'd argue against the divide. Not a single aspect of one's existence is atomic, if I may use this term in philosophy. A personal philosophy will always lean to one or the other, but it will never entirely be either one. I'm personally convinced this playing field isn't horizontal but vertical, with objectivity at the bottom. Subjectivity is based upon purely objective information. The border between the two appears at the point where objective events are not experienced as such, but abstracted into subjectivity. I wouldn't argue that there's no subjectivity at all. An external entity, say, a neurologist, can take all of a person's subjective experiences and translate them into objective data. This data won't have the same intrinsic value though, but can in theory be used to recreate the same subjective state. I see the human being as a complex Turing machine. See my post about Turing, Moore and dualism for more information.

But if you have to have to divide the people into groups, I'd say there are three. Those who deny objectivity, those who deny subjectivity and those who support both. So the only divide possible would be the "subjective/objective/both" version. The only people not falling in the latter will be the people who have thought about the subject in an abstract way. The vast majority of the people will be unaware about the entire situation and automatically end up in the "both" section.

In any case, we have quite a phenomenon at work in the west, where it's evident people are falling unawares onto one side or the other of the objective/subjective divide.

To further proceed with your arguments at hand, I think the problem with the very definition of atheism though is that atheism is a WESTERN idea. If you ask a buddhist if they consider themselves atheists they would disagree (as they would say they are buddhists), therefore I think there is a faultry in the definition of assuming that our atheism actually could properly encompass buddhism because there is no belief in a deity. It should also here be noted that many Asian reilgions and philosophies has also adapted a more wholistic world view in comparison to the West.

And to answer your question properly, I cannot honestly answer to you. However, atheism only defines itself as the lack of belief in a deity, by extension also a rejection of all that is metaphysical, according to a western context. You can however still remain an atheist while being spiritual though, I could myself maybe be considered as such. So I guess the problem itself lies in how we as westerners rather choose to define atheism, where it gets troublesome since CD is so wired into our thoughts, thinking of everything in dichotomonies. So, taking back what I said earlier, one way to properly answer your question could simply be a redefintion of what ahteism truly means and what it stands for, disregarding the common use of the term and in addition of course also, missuse. Atheism by default might not reject all forms of metaphysics, merely that of a deity (which is also originally means in Greek). This also solves the problem regarding whether we can consider buddhism a form of atheism. Then, if you, as an atheist, choose to not believe in any form of metaphysics is another thing. I frankly believe that all unexplained phenomena as we know them today can someday be explained, may they have to be with metaphysics or not. However, that has more got to do with my view of wanting to avoid the dichotomony of the physical vs the metaphysical, as I want to believe they are the same, and that the idea of the metaphysical is in itiself an erraneous concept.

Therefore I am sure that what you here call "anti-trascendency" shouldn't necessarily be included into the defintion of atheism, and that maybe we simply need to go back to the original meaning of the word where it simply means no belief in any god, with a more open and undefined undertone that you can believe in anything else and yet be an atheist, as long no belief in a deity is involved in those beliefs.

First, with respect to the commentaries offered above, I wish to address the nominal identity put forward between the "Western" phenomenon of atheism and Buddhist atheism. This identity obscures a radical qualitative difference between the two. One is aimed at transcendence, whereas the other definitely possesses an intrinsic antipathy toward anything which might admit of transcendence.

So, for practical purposes, let me adhere to the topic and direct my remarks to the "Western" phenomenon of atheism.

Whence this phenomenon of "anti-transcendence" (if I may refer to it on these terms)? I would argue that a big part of the answer can be inferred from LeaT's articles here.

LeaT, your premise is essentially an ontological one, and by extension, an anthropological one. Therefore, I pose the question again: How does one adopt an "anti-transcendent" outlook (an oxymoron, I should think) without stepping right into the Cartesian bear-trap?